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In the theory of monetary and fiscal policy interaction, the assumption of Ricardian 
households isolates the determinants of fiscal policy instrument from the price stabilization 
policies carried out by the central bank. One of the main implications of the above 
mentioned Ricardian assumption is that the fiscal policy does not have any distortionary 
effect for the economy, i.e. it does not affect the behaviour of the households, supporting 
that way the fiscal policy’s neutrality. The argument for this view comes if one assumes 
that fiscal policy has a distortionary effect on the behaviour of the agents. We relax the 
above non distortionary assumption by assuming that the imposition of the taxes is 
consistent with a transaction cost of the tax system that underlies the state - tax payer 
interaction. In this way we develop a channel through which the stability of prices carried 
out by the independent central bank is, within optimality, also a function of the fiscal policy 
determinants (the transaction cost, the tax rates and the debt level). The analysis is carried 
out in a framework of a monetary union, with two different countries. Within this 
framework, the effectiveness of a numerical fiscal rule is also examined. 
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1. Introduction 
In the theory of monetary and fiscal policy interactions, the assumption of 
Ricardian households isolates fiscal policy aspects from the determination of equilibrium. 
The non-distortionary (lump sum) taxation assumption, in the majority of these models, 
abstracts from the need to analyse the effect of the fiscal instrument, resulting in the 
neutrality of fiscal policy. Thus, monetary policy –as described by the Taylor rule
1– plays a 
deterministic role in equilibrium, increasing the importance of the monetary policy 
parameters. Hence neither debt dynamics, nor the endogenous effects of the fiscal 
instruments, play a role in determining equilibrium, implying fiscal policy neutrality with 
respect to inflation.  
 
By contrast, when one deviates from the assumption of Ricardian equivalence and 
turns to a distortionary system of taxation, then the inflationary consequences of fiscal 
policy for inflation have to be examined. Edge and Rudd (2003) show that the coefficient 
on inflation in the Taylor rule depends positively on the tax rate, indicating non-neutrality 
of fiscal policy. 
 
Under the assumption of distortionary taxation, fiscal policy affects the behaviour 
of households, it distorts macroeconomic variables (income -via income and substitution 
effects-, consumption etc) and affects, in a dynamic way, the effectiveness of this fiscal 
instrument. Thus, by relaxing the assumption of non-distortionary lump sum taxation, we 
let fiscal policy have an endogenous effect on fiscal deficits and, consequently, on the debt 
path, generating consequences for inflation. 
 
The non-neutrality of fiscal policy has been discussed in the literature in an 
asymmetric way
2 by using either ad hoc policy rules, in a stochastic environment, or a 
proportional tax system, in a general equilibrium framework. As Leeper and Yun (2005) 
mention, “although instructive for some purposes, the assumption that all taxes are lump 
sum prevents the fiscal theory from being understood in the context of broader Public 
Finance”. 
 
The analysis becomes more interesting when one considers the question of 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union, like, for example, EMU, with 
different countries and one central bank. It is then possible for each country’s fiscal policy 
to have spillover effects on price stability. Such effects are validated for the euro area, by 
                                                 
1 See Taylor (1993). 
2 See, for example, Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994), (2001), (2003), Benhabib et. al (1997), Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (1997), (2001), Leeper and Yun (2005), Schabert and von Thadden (2006).   6
simulation results
3: for example, an increase in Germany’s public expenditures by 1% of 
GDP increases the (common) inflation rate by 0.4%. 
 
Our analysis deviates from the above framework in the following ways:  
 
By deviating from the homogeneity assumption, used in the majority of the 
literature, we analyse monetary and fiscal policy interactions within a Monetary Union, 
assuming heterogeneous countries. Our main contribution, within this framework, is the 
introduction of the operation or transaction cost of the tax system into economic (monetary 
and fiscal) policy analysis. In this way, we allow fiscal policy to endogenously affect (via 
the transaction cost) the price stabilisation policies of the Common Central Bank (CCB), 
thus resulting to the non-neutrality of fiscal policy. 
 
The notion of this transaction cost (see also Jrbashyan and Harutyunyan (2006)) is 
similar to the notion of a transaction cost that appears in other market activities. It 
comprises the notions of tax collection (Barro (1979)), tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), Feinstein (1991)) and tax compliance (Clotfelter (1983), Andreoni et. al. (1998)), 
which are closely related to the behaviour of different types of tax payers that refer to the 
state–tax-payer interaction. 
 
Our paper focuses on two directions. In the first, we endogenously derive (within 
optimality) the functional form of the transaction cost. In the second, we investigate the 
constraints this cost (endogenously) imposes on the efficiency of fiscal policy. In this way, 
we develop a channel, through which, fiscal policy is related to price stability –the primary 
objective of the CCB– via the notion of the transaction cost of the tax system. Furthermore, 
within this framework, we investigate the effectiveness of fiscal rules (like, for example, 
the European Union Stability and Growth Pact) in building sound fiscal policies and 
maintaining price stability. 
 
2. The model 
We build a model with two types of countries: those with a debt level above their 
reference value (debtor countries) and those with a debt level below their reference value 
(non-debtor countries). For simplicity and without loss of generality, our economy consists 
of two countries, a debtor and a non-debtor one, and the central bank.  
 
                                                 
3 See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, (2007), European Commission, Vol.6(2).   7
Within each country, we assume that there exists a society, whose decision to re-
elect the government is the result of the solution to an optimisation problem. Thus, in our 
economy, we have three agents: society, government and the central bank. 
2.1 Society 
Society has preferences over consumption and public goods, which are described 
by a loss function. Its aim is to minimise this loss function. This minimisation procedure 
raises the issue of whether society should optimally re-elect the existing government or not, 
since it is the government’s (policy) choices that determine, up to a point, its loss function. 
 
Specifically, the society in either country has preferences over consumption (C) 
and public expenditure (G). These preferences are described by a loss function of the form 
L
s = – C
2 – β
.G
2                                                              (1) 
with C = W -T, where W stands for the wage and T for the tax levels. 
Assuming W =1, we can write:  
C = 1 – T                                                                  (2) 
2.2 The governments 
As far as the government of each country is concerned, we deviate from the usual 
assumption of the benevolent dictator and we assume that it cares about the operational 
cost of its fiscal policy decisions. It produces public goods by issuing debt and by 
collecting taxes, facing a transaction cost. The government wants to be re-elected; its re-
election depends on the probability of no re-election, P, which is discussed in more detail 
later. Hence the government cares about its probability of (no) re-election
4. 
 
Governments choose their tax policies (tax rates) aiming at minimising their loss 
functions. In particular, each government’s preferences are described by a loss function that 
depends on the transaction cost of the tax system, on public expenditure and on the 
probability of no re-election
5 (or, equivalently, the cost of not being re-elected). 
 
 
More specifically, in our analysis we allow for a monetary union (MU) formed by 
two countries: the first, country i, has a debt level, expressed as a percentage of its GDP, 
greater than a reference value
6  ( ) b  i.e. bb ii > . The second, country j, has joined the MU 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting at this point, that this self-interest characteristic of the government is consistent with its 
interest in the frictions created by its policy choices. 
5 See equation (4) in the sequel. 
6 We use the small letters to express the magnitude, expressed in capital letters, divided by the GDP, i.e. for 
any X , it shall be x= 
X/Y.   8
with a debt level less than or equal to its reference value, that is,bb jj ≤ . For simplicity, let 
the reference debt value be the same for both countries, i.e. let  ij bbb = = . 
 
The transaction cost of the tax system corresponds to a micro characteristic of 
public finance, reflecting the distortionary character of the tax system. Our aim is to enter 
this into a monetary and fiscal policy interaction model, in order to endogenously 
investigate, via a micro foundation setting, the way the distortions generated by fiscal 
policy affect the macroeconomic variables within MU and the conditions under which this 
takes place, if at all. 
 
The imposition of taxes generates frictions due to state–taxpayer interactions. 
These frictions relate the behaviour of taxpayers, stipulated by economic, sociological and 
psychological characteristics, to tax administration aspects, like tax collection and tax 
compliance, thus resulting in a loss of the tax revenue, with budgetary consequences
7. 
Since the effect of the marginal tax rate on the behaviour of tax payers is not controversial 
in fiscal theory, we consider the transaction cost of the tax system as a function of the tax 
rate. 
 
Following Barro (1979), we assume
8 the operational cost of the tax system (Zt) to 
be equal to net tax collections (T) multiplied by a function ( f ) of the tax rate (τ), i.e. the 
transaction cost function is Z=T 
.  f(τ). However, we deviate from Barro by not pre-
assuming the properties of Z and f, but by endogenously deriving their properties from the 
optimal solution of the model. The only, reasonable, assumption we make is that f
 ΄>0, 
which reflects the notion of the operational cost, due to the existence of the tax rate. 
 
As a logical consequence of the above and since the marginal tax rate is the 
source of frictions between the state and the tax payers, the government’s fiscal policy, as 
implemented through the tax instrument, affects the households’ opinion (satisfaction or 
not) of the government. If one assumes that the government wants to be re-elected by 
households, then such dissatisfaction entails a cost for the government. In our analysis we 
assume that this cost enters the governments’ preferences; in other words, we assume that 
each government cares about the effect of its policies on the households’ welfare. 
 
More specifically, we assume that the exact effect of society’s perception of the 
government’s policy choices is embodied in a function Φ of the form:  
                                                 
7 Clotfelter (1983) reports that, in 1976, the unreported income in USA was $75 billion to $100 billion, or 7% 
to 9%, of the reported income. 
8 See Appendix 1.   9
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where P stands for the probability of no re-election, L and L  are the critical values for the 
society’s loss: if the actual loss exceeds L , then the government is not re-elected (with 
probability P =1); if the loss is below L , then the government is re-elected for sure (i.e. P 
=0), while it is P∈(0,1), whenever the society’s loss is between L and L . Thus, the way  
society’s loss function ( L
S ) affects the objective function of the government is determined 
by the way changes in  L
S  affect the society’s willingness to vote for the government.  
 
We use the exogenous probability of no re-election, P, as a measure of this 
willingness. Specifically, we assume that P corresponds to real numbers, in such a way that 
a high number is always related to high values of the society’s loss function ( L
S ). 
Intuitively, this implies that the unsatisfied society, i.e. a society with a high loss function, 
will be less likely to re-elect the government, and hence P will be high. Hence, the loss 
function of the society affects the government’s loss function, to the extent that the 
probability of no re-election indicates and it should, therefore, be included in the 
government’s loss function.  
 
So, the government’s loss function can be written as:  
22 GS LZ GP L ξ = +⋅ +⋅                                                       (4) 
where G stands for the public good. The term  PL ii
S ⋅  captures the exact effect the society’s 
loss function has on the government’s objective function. With the appropriate 
rearrangements, the above loss function can be written
9 as:  
( )
22 2 G LZ P GP C βξ =− − ⋅− ⋅                                                (5) 
thus, in a two country world, 
LZP GP C i
G
ii i =− − ⋅− ⋅
22 2 βξ b g                                             (5.i) 
corresponds to the objective function of the government of country i and   
LZP GP C j
G
jj j =− − ⋅− ⋅
22 2 βξ b g                                           (5. j) 
                                                 
9 Notice that if it is the case that Pβ-ξ>0  ⇒ P > 
ξ/β then the government’s loss reduces with an increase in 
the public expenditures underlying the characteristics of a myopic government, when it is most likely not to 
be re-elected (Alesina (1990), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990), Rogoff (1990)). On the other hand when P < 
ξ/β (i.e when there is, practically, no political 
uncertainty) an increase in expenditures implies a budgetary cost for the government.   10
to that of country j. 
 
 
In our analysis, we delve into deriving conclusions about the effectiveness of 
fiscal rules when the countries are heterogeneous within the MU. The role of the budget 
constraint is vital for this investigation. Crucial for such a budget constraint is the way the 
fiscal rules enter and affect the countries of our economy, both the debtor and the non-
debtor country. 
 
Following Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Debrun (2007) as well as that fiscal 
rules constitute an inhibitory mechanism for governments to accumulate public debt 
beyond a certain threshold, b , we introduce the cost for breaching this threshold. One way 
of approaching this cost is by considering it as a numerical fiscal rule (like, for example, 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)) that corresponds to utility or budgetary losses for the 
policy makers, when they deviate from the rule
10. 
 
However, in the case of numerical fiscal rules, these losses for the breaching 
(debtor) country are assumed to be distributed among the other (non-debtor) countries of  
the MU, implying budgetary gains for them. Additionally, we define δ∈(0, 1) as the degree 
of austerity for deviating from the rules. Thus, the term  ( ) i bb δ −  shows the loss for the 
debtor country (with i bb > ), or, equivalently, the gain for the non-debtor country. In other 
words, δ bb ii − di  stands for the cost to country i of breaching the threshold of this reference 
value. 
 
More specifically, the recourse constraint for the debtor country
11 can be written 
as:   















ie =− −+− +− − δπ π di ch 1 1 
Dividing by the country’s national income at time t, Yt
i , we get:  
         ( ) ( ) 1 11
ii i e
ti t t gb b b b δ ππ − =− − + − + −                                       (6) 
where π
e and π are the expected and actual levels of inflation, respectively, and bt
i
−1 is the 
amount of debt issued by the government and traded in the market in the preceding period. 
                                                 
10 This can be consistent with the Act (104)c of the Maastricht Treaty, where the cost for deviating from the 
rules (i.e. for having a debt level greater than 60% of its GDP) is set to be a non negligible amount of GDP. 
11 Recall that country i’s debt level is assumed to be greater than its reference value.   11
Following Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) we assume that the real world market interest rate is 
zero. In order for risk neutral agents to be willing to hold government bonds the expected 
rate of return, π
e, includes a mark-up equal to the expected inflation rate. The ex-post real 
rate of return is given by π
e – π.  
 
For the non-debtor country, j (whose debt level is below its reference value), the 
resource constraint captures the idea that following sound fiscal policies results in a gain 
within the above-mentioned redistribution
12 among the (debtor and the non-debtor) 
countries. These constraints can be written as  







je ++ − =+ +− − δπ π di ch 1 1 







je =+ −+− +− − δπ π di ch 1 1 
where, dividing by Yt
j , we get the way the government finances its expenditures.  





je =+ − + − + − − 11 1 δπ π di ch                                       (7) 
 
Summarising, the problem the government of each country (i, j) faces, can be 
written as:  










Lz P g P c
τ βξ =− − −
22 2 bg  







ie =− −+− + − − 11 1 δπ π di ch  
with z
 =
 Z/Y , and  










Lz P g P c
τ βξ =− − −
22 2 b g  





je =+ − + − + − − 11 1 δπ π di ch  
Obviously, δ = 0 corresponds to the case where there exists no numerical fiscal 
rule. 
2.3 The common central bank 
The common central banker is appointed in order to carry out price stabilisation 
policies. He takes into account the total debt level and derives the optimal inflation rule to 
follow, for any given fiscal policies. This implies that the central banker may also be aware 
of the constraints that unsustainable public finances impose on the monetary policy rule, 
which is consistent with the non-Ricardian Regime of our analysis, reflecting that way 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply, including the effect of fiscal policy, affect price 
                                                 
12 An alternative way of approaching this is to think of the term  ( ) i bb δ −  as the level of the penalty, imposed 
on the debtor country, for deviating from the debt rules and distributed among the other countries.   12
stability. On the other hand, in our model the rate of inflation works as an interest rate, with 
its changes affecting the debt level for each country (and hence the total debt for the MU). 
 
The above allow us to write the total debt level for the MU as a function of the 
rate of inflation π, i.e.  ~ b π b g. So, it is logical to assume that the CCB has preferences about 
inflation and the fiscal constraints described by the path of the total debt at the MU levels
13. 
The CCB’s objective is to determine the (common for both countries) inflation level, which 
is consistent with its stabilisation policies. This objective is described by a loss function of 
the form:  
() ( )
2 2 CCB Lb γ πθ π =+   
with γ, θ∈ 01 , b gand where  ~ b  stands for the total MU debt, i.e.  ~ bbb ij =+. 
 




π γ πθ π =+   
 
3. Solution 
We solve the above optimisation problems as a simultaneous equation problem. 
We look for the optimal policies that each of the countries and the central banker should 
adopt, in order to minimise their losses.  
 
Within this framework, we also consider the constraints imposed on the efficiency 
of the fiscal policy through the transaction cost of the tax system, and the way this is 
related to the political cycle. The existence of a transaction cost captures the fact that, 
before the time tax payers are called upon to pay taxes, they have already weighed up their 
gains and losses from this procedure and they decide, accordingly, on the degree to which 
they will comply with the fiscal rules. This relationship between tax-payers and the state 
(represented, in each time, by the governing political party) is a direct implication of the tax 
system that creates frictions. It is these frictions that govern the magnitude of the 
transaction cost and that, eventually, circumscribe the efficiency of the fiscal policy, 
putting pressure on the price stabilisation policy of the CCB.  
 
                                                 
13 See also Van Aarle et. al (1997), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Chari and kehoe (2007) and Nguyen and 
Kakinaka (2006).   13
In this way, we describe a mechanism through which the fiscal policy of each 
country within the MU interacts with the monetary policy of the CCB, where optimality 
depends on the microeconomic characteristics of the fiscal policy.  
 
The first order conditions for the government of country i’s maximisation problem, 
are:  
( ) () 0
G
i
ii ii i i ii
i
L
zf f P g P c τβ ξ
τ
∂ ′ =⇒ +⋅ = ⋅− −⋅
∂
                                   (8) 
and  








δδ π π −
∂
=⇒ +− −+ − + − =
∂
                           (9) 
 












j τβ ξ c h c h                               (10) 
and  
()() 1 01 1 0
G








=⇒+ − + − − + − =
∂
                        (11) 
From equations (8) and (10), we can easily derive (since f
  ΄>0  for both i  and j )  the 









                                                           (12) 
This proves that the existence of the tax system is consistent with frictions, reflecting the 
state – tax-payers’ interaction, which is not independent of the households’ preferences, as 
these are expressed by the government’s re-election. This is also justified by the existence 
of the political cycle. 
 













                                       (13)   14
4. Analysis 
4.1 The transaction cost of the tax system 
In this section we carry out a theoretical investigation of the way the transaction 
cost of the tax system (expressed as a percentage of GDP) is related to the tax rate and we 
endogenously derive the properties of the transaction cost function. 
 
 From the fist order conditions (8) and (10), it can be shown
14 that in any country, 





f fP g P c
z
τβ ξ ′ += − − ⋅ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦                                      (14) 
The transaction cost is described by the function z
 = τ
 .f(τ). Hence, differentiating 







τ bg . Thus, f + τ
.f
 ΄ shows the way the transaction cost 
changes with the tax rate. We treat f + τ
.f ΄ as the first order derivative of a function z with 
z(τ)=τ
 . f(τ). The second order derivative of this function, z΄΄(τ), alternates sign and so the 
transaction cost function z(t) exhibits an inflection point
15 at 
zP g c g
** * ,( ) , τβ ξ τ c h c h =⋅ − −  
 
As a result, the operation cost of the tax system is related, in a non-linear way, to 
the tax rate, as can be seen from Figure 1
16. Moreover, from this figure, it is obvious that 
the transaction cost of the tax system (and hence the frictions as well) increases at a 
diminishing rate for tax rates less than τ
*, while it increases at an increasing rate, for tax 




                                                 
14 For the moment, we abstract the lower case indices (i, j), which distinguish the countries. 
15 For the proof, see Appendix 1. 












Figure 1: The operation cost of the tax system as a non linear function of the tax rate.   15
Rearranging (14) gives 
()()
1
tt t t t
t
f fP g c g
z
τβ ξ ′ += ⋅ − − ⋅ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦                                         (14.a) 
which shows that society’s reaction to the government’s economic policy choices (as this is 
reflected in the probability of no re-election (P)), affects the rate of change of the 
transaction cost of the tax system (ft + τ f΄t). Consequently, the political cycle is related to 
the government’s choices and to the, endogenous, way in which the efficiency of the fiscal 
policy works, embodying, in this way households’ preferences, as these are shaped by the 
welfare implications of the government’s fiscal policy. 
 
In an attempt to qualitatively represent the frictions fiscal policy creates, as a 
result of the state – tax-payer relation, we describe in the sequel the exact way the political 
cycle is related to the transaction cost of the tax system: 
 
Abstracting from the mathematical analysis (which is provided in Appendix 4), it 
can be seen from Figure 2 that, when the change of the transaction cost, as a result of the 
government’s choice to increase the tax rate, is relatively small, then the probability of no 
re-election for the government is reduced. The economic, sociological and psychological 
aspects related to the fiscal policy choices, which reflect the behaviour of the households, 
are related, via the probability of no re-election, to the political cycle and the way this 
affects the government’s economic choices, if it cares about the political cost (re-election 
or not) of these choices. 
 
 
Thus, when the government chooses to increase the tax rate within the range [τ0, 
τ1], the increase in the transaction cost of the tax system is relatively small and it is related 
to an efficient fiscal policy, since it is consistent with small frictions. The probability of no 









Figure 2: Changes in the probability of no reelection along the transaction cost 
function.   16
re-election decreases within this area and, hence, the government is more likely to be re-
elected. 
 
When the government chooses tax rates higher than τ1, the operation cost of the 
fiscal choices increases resulting in inefficiencies. The state–tax-payers’ interaction is more 
likely to be characterised by large frictions and it has a political cost, since the probability 
of no re-election increases. 
 
From Figure 2, we can observe that the probability of no re-election (seen as an 
indicator of the people’s dissatisfaction with the government’s tax policy) also rises for 
very small tax rates. This, within optimality and in terms of our analysis, corresponds to an 
area of tax rates close to zero, where the transaction cost function is very inelastic
17, 
indicating that small increases in tax rates are consistent with very high rates of growth of 
the transaction cost.  
 
This is in line with the logic of our model and the notion of the transaction cost. In 
other words, it describes society’s dissatisfaction (an indicator of which is the probability 
of no re-election, P) when, from a world of no taxes (i.e. zero tax rates) the government 
starts imposing taxes (i.e. positive tax rates).  
 
However, here we do not go into the details of this case since, as real world 
practice indicates, the tax rates chosen by the fiscal authorities are not negligible. Hence, 
our analysis focuses on tax rates greater than τ0. 
4.2 Reply functions 
In this section we derive the optimal reply functions for each country, which depict the 
way the fiscal policy of each country interacts with that of the other, through the constraints 
imposed by the monetary policy of the independent CCB. This is done by combining the 
first order conditions of the optimisation problems previously described.  
 
More specifically, these reply functions are derived from the first order conditions 
(9) and (11) of the countries’ problems and the optimal inflation rule, as this is defined by 
the first order conditions (13) of the CCB’s problem. 
 
                                                 










′ += = = − ∞    17
Under the assumption of rational expectations and after the appropriate 
rearrangements we derive
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Similarly, for country j, the reaction functionbb b j
j
ij t
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Both optimal reply functions are negatively sloped
19 with 




i       () () <  
 
These properties of the loci bb j
ij
i





We will show that these reaction functions embody the way the microeconomic 
characteristics of the fiscal policy, explained by the frictions of the transaction cost of the 
                                                 
18 For the proof, see Appendix 5. 









Figure 3: The reaction functions   18
tax system, are related to the political cycle and the monetary policy followed by the 
independent CCB. 
 
The equilibrium is determined by the intersection point of the two reaction 
functions. This will be derived by simultaneously solving
20 equations (15) and (16), which 
gives:




jj j j j ii i i t t ti t t t
jj i i ii i i
jj t i i t t t
zf f P zf f b b bP b b b
bg g b b
PP b P P b bb
τ βξ τδ δ βξ
δ
−− −− − −
−− − −
′ + ′ − ⎡+ ⎤ + − −−







Expression (17) provides a rule for the path of the economy, since it characterises 
all the intersection points of  ()
i
ji bb and ()
j




4.3 The CCB response 
The Common Central Banker is independent. His only objective is to use his 
policy instrument, the interest rate, in order to keep the inflation rate below or equal to a 
reference value
21, under the constraints imposed by the fiscal policies of the country-
members. This implies a relationship between the fiscal policies of the two countries (as 
                                                 
20 See Appendix 7. 









() i bb 
Figure 4: The representation of the economy’s total debt, as determined by the 
intersection points of the countries’ reaction functions.   19




As shown before (eq. 13), given optimisation, monetary and fiscal policies are 












We look at the above relationship, as the first order derivative of a function ~ b( π), 
which describes the best response of the CCB regarding the changes in the total debt level 










we have endogenously derived the properties of a function ~ b (π), which shows the optimal 
response of the CCB to the fiscal outcome and the effect this response has on the total debt 
level. 
 
The above are described in Figure 5 below. 
 
 




 , as described by (13), is a function of the 
inflation level, π, the value of the total debt within the MU (~ b ) will depend on the level of 
inflation. That is, whenever inflation changes, the MU’s total debt is affected and this is 
                                                 
22 See eq. (6), (7), (15) and (16). 
23 See Appendix 8 for the proof. 
( ) b π   
b 
π
Figure 5: CCB’s optimal response to the fiscal outcome (b ).   20
shown by moving along the line
  ~ b (π). This is because a tight monetary policy by the CCB 
increases the ex post real rate of return, π
e –
 π and, hence, the debt level for each country 
member, via the term (1+π
e-π)bt-1 of their budget constraint. Woodford (2003) notes that 
“… monetary policy (the choice of it ) affects the evolution of the public debt, even in the 
absence of seignorage revenues, through its consequences for debt service on existing 
government debt. In most advance economies, this is actually the most important fiscal 
consequence of monetary policy …”. 
 
Additionally, the shape of the ~ b( π) function, as well as the economic 
interpretation of this shape, is along the lines of King’s (1995) analysis. He uses the 
expression  “some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic” in order to describe the effects of the 
central bankers’ disinflationary policies on the debt dynamics. 
4.4 Economic policy analysis 
 
In this section we aim at making economic policy inferences. For this, we will 
combine the properties of the above-mentioned transaction cost and the constraints it 
imposes on the efficiency of fiscal policy, with the derived reaction functions of the 
country members and the CCB. In this way, we will be able to determine the debt path for 
each country separately, as well as the path of total debt (for the MU).  
 
This procedure will also enable us to specify the optimal trajectory for our 
economy, which is not independent of the CCB’s optimal policy (as this is formally 
explained by its reply function), thus implying the existence of second order effects. 
Because the degree of the countries’ homogeneity is a determining factor of the 
whole economy’s path, in the sequel we study our economy under different scenarios 
regarding the countries’ level of the transaction cost, as this cost is assumed to be the main 
factor for homogeneity. Hence, we can study the constraints, if any, it imposes on the 
strategic behaviour of the countries, as well as the way this is related to the political cycle. 
 
We can categorise our scenarios into two groups: The first consists of the cases 
where the countries face considerably different levels of transaction costs, or equivalently, 
where they lie within different ranges of the transaction cost function z. Within our 
framework, this is the most “realistic” scenario
24. The second scenario, includes cases 
where the countries (although heterogeneous regarding, for example, their initial debt 
                                                 
24 This also applies to the EMU case of heterogeneous countries (as this is signified by the existence of fiscal 
rules, like, for example the Stability and Growth Pact).   21
conditions) face similar transaction costs, that is, they both lie within the same range of the 
transaction cost function z. 
 
We show that when we have a considerable degree of heterogeneity, the transaction 
cost of the tax system is the factor determining the countries’ policy choices and hence, the 
resulting level of debt and its inflationary consequences. On the other hand, when we have 
a considerable degree of homogeneity, it is the countries’ strategic behaviour that 
determines the outcome. 
 
Scenario 1: when the countries are asymmetric with respect to their tax system’s 
transaction cost function 
 
When the fiscal authorities choose tax rates that differ considerably from each 
other, corresponding to different levels of costs on the transaction cost function, then the 
countries face different properties regarding their tax system’s transaction cost and, 
consequently, they are related to different efficiency levels of their fiscal/tax policies. In 
this case, the (initial) heterogeneity of the countries results in a different outcome for the 
economy, depending on which country (the initially better-off or the other one) has set the 
higher tax rates. We therefore assume that each country increases its tax rate and we look 
for the economy’s outcome within the following cases. 
 




25 country i has a relatively lower rate of increase of its transaction cost 
due to each unit increase of the country’s tax rates, compared to that of country j. This, 






















                                          (18) 
where CTi stands for the constant term of country i’s reply function. 
 
This suggests that any increase of Pi (as a result
27 of a government’s attempt to 
increase tax rates in order to finance the country’s debt) would shift the locus  ()
i
ji bb 
backwards from  ()
i
ji bb0 to  ()
i
ji bb1, resulting in a reduction of country i’s debt level. 
                                                 
25 Because of the form of the transaction cost function z, as this is described in detail in 1. 





Country j, chooses high tax rates, being situated at the right end of the transaction 
cost function, where the rates of change are high, pointing to high frictions. This means that 
the tax-payers’ dissatisfaction, caused by the welfare implications of any increase of the tax 
rates is high, and hence the probability of no re-election is also high. In this case the 
government’s tax instrument is inefficient in serving country j’s debt.  
As for country i, within optimality
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                                          (19)  
(where CTj stands for the constant term of country j’s reply function). Any increase in 
country  j’s tax rates would moderate society’s welfare, driving up the government’s 
probability of no re-election. Consequently, the locus  ()
j





ji bb1, causing country j’s debt level to rise. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
27 Recall that, as indicated by (14a), the rate of change of the transaction cost is monotonically related to the 
society’s dissatisfaction, as this is captured by the probability of no re-election. 
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Figure 6: The path of the economy when the debtor country introduces lower taxes than 
the non debtor one.   23
In addition to this, if the government in this country, thinking about its re-election, 
considers increasing public spending, the country’s debt would end up even higher, since
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In this case, more taxes will be required coming with increasing rates of change of the 















                                         (21) 
 
As a result, the total MU debt also increases, as shown from the shift from  0 b   to 
1 b  , in Figure 6, triggering off a monetary policy tightening (indicated by (13)), by the CCB. 
As a second order effect of such a tight policy, the level of inflation falls, while the total 
MU debt increases, moving the economy from point 1 to point 2 in Figure 6. 
 
CASE 1.2: the debtor country, i, has introduced higher tax rates than the non-debtor 
one 
 
In this case, which is graphically shown in Figure 7, the government of the non 
debtor country j exploits its tax instrument’s efficiency
29 which is related to low frictions 
and hence it enjoys a higher probability of re-election (i.e. a lower Pj). 
                                                 
28 See Appendix 9. 
29 This efficiency stems from the fact that its tax rates correspond to the “flat” area of the transaction cost 
function z, indicating a very low rate of change of its tax system transaction cost and, hence, that an increase 
in its tax rate would result in relatively higher tax revenues, due to the negligible rate of change of the 




Equation (19) suggests that any reduction in the probability Pj would shift the locus  ()
j
ji bb 








), from  ()
j
ji bb0 to  ()
j
ji bb1, resulting in a reduction of country j’s debt 
level. 
 
On the other hand, the high frictions underlying the tax policy of country i are 
related to a higher level of the transaction cost and, consequently, to an inefficient tax 
instrument in reducing the country’s debt. 
 
Regarding country i, equation (18) holds, implying that any increase in the 
country’s tax rates would cause the government of country i’s probability of no re-election 








) and hence, the locus  ()
i
ji bb to shift to the right, from  ()
i
ji bb0 to 
()
i
ji bb1. This will increase the country’s debt level. This is depicted in the above graph by a 
movement from the starting point 0 to point 1. 
 
This result is justified by the logic of the transaction cost we develop in this paper. 
The total MU debt is reduced in this case, allowing for a looser monetary policy by the 
CCB (within the limits set regarding the level of inflation, e.g. π < 2% for the case of 
τ 
z 





























Figure 7: The path of the economy when the debtor country introduces higher taxes 
than the non debtor one.   25
EMU). A change in the inflation level would affect, in a certain way, the slope of the loci 
()
j
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The path of the debt level of each country separately, as well as of the total MU 
debt is shown by the trajectory in the above figure. 
 
Scenario 2: when the countries are symmetric with respect to their tax system’s 
transaction cost function 
 
The existence of symmetric transaction cost functions allows for strategic 
substitutability
31 among the countries. Specifically, when both countries face similar 
transaction cost functions, they also face cost functions with the same properties. This 
means that the countries are also similar regarding the effectiveness of their tax policies 
and that their governments have similar chances for re-election. Hence there is space for 
strategic behaviour, which was not the determining factor in the previous scenario, where 
the outcome was determined mainly by the constraints of the transaction cost, imposed on 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy by the tax systems. 
 
Technically, the symmetry of this scenario means that both countries lie within the 
same “area” along the transaction cost function and that they both increase their tax rates 
within the same range. 
 
We therefore develop our analysis of this scenario, over the following cases: 
 
CASE 2.1:  both countries choose tax rates which are related to a transaction cost that 
exhibits low rates of change 
 
The increase of the tax rates for both countries in this case is consistent with a 
transaction cost which increases at a low rate as a result of any increase of the tax rates, that 
is, the fiscal authorities increase the tax rates within the range [ 01 , τ τ ] of  Figure 8. 
                                                 
30 As shown in Appendix 5. 




Regarding country i, it is worth noting that its debt level, bi , is initially above the 
reference value ( i bb > ). The fact that the transaction cost of the country’s tax system 
changes at a low rate makes it possible for the government to effectively use its tax 
instrument in order to reduce its debt level (which falls from bi0 to bi1) as a result
32 of a 
backward shift of the locus  ()
i
ji bb from  0 ()
i
ji bb  to 1 ()
i
ji bb . 
 
On the other hand, when country j is called upon to take a decision, it faces a debt 
level below the reference value and (the same as country i) a low rate of change of its 
transaction cost. This facilitates the country’s public policy, which can result in a lower 
probability of no re-election, Pj, as a result of an increase in the tax rates. 
 
Since the tax instrument is efficient at reducing the debt level, the incumbent in this 
country could behave opportunistically









) at the cost of the country’s debt level (bj increases) as well as the total MU 
level (b  also increases). This observation is also consistent and further supported by the 


















33 Beetsma et. al. (2001), Alesina (1990), Alesina and Tabellini (1987) 
Figure 8: The path of the economy when the transaction cost is symmetric, exhibiting 
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34. Besides, an increase in public spending would –within optimality– 









and, hence, to a higher level of the transaction cost
35 zj . This gives an additional reason for 
the increase in the country’s debt level, which is depicted in the above graph by a shift in 
the locus  ()
j
ji bb from  ()
i
ji bb0 to  ()
i
ji bb1.  
 
The total MU debt, b , increases, triggering off a tight monetary policy
36 resulting 
in a lower level of inflation. This creates second order effects on the level of each country’s 
debt as well as on the level of total debt. These correspond to a change in the slopes of the 
countries’ debt loci, moving the economy along the indicated trajectory, to point 2 in the 
above graph. 
 
At this point it can be mentioned that the Central Banker’s behaviour affects the 
behaviour of the countries, as reflected in the above-mentioned change in the slopes of the 
corresponding loci. This is also consistent with the findings of Beetsma et al (2001) and is 
indicative of the interaction between the two policies, monetary and public. 
 
CASE 2.2:  both countries choose tax rates which are related to a transaction cost that 
exhibits relatively high rates of change 
 
When the countries choose tax rates within the range (τ1, 1], the transaction cost of 
their tax systems exhibits high rates of change as a result of an increase in their tax rates. 
 
The high debt level of country i ( i bb > ), in connection with the high transaction 
cost (due to its high rate of change) makes its tax instrument inefficient in reducing the 
country’s debt. The country’s debt level increases and so does society’s dissatisfaction 
(resulting in a higher probability of no re-election, Pi ). This is depicted
37 by a shift in the 
locus  ()
i
ji bb from  0 ()
i
ji bb  to  1 ()
i
ji bb  in Figure 9 below. 
This increase in country i’s debt level could also be explained as the result of 
strategic behaviour within the scenario of opportunistic behaviour by the party in office: 
                                                 
34 As shown in Appendix 10, here, there is no upper limit for gj. Note that this is not true in the following case 
2.1, where an upper limit for the government’s public expenditure does exist. 
35 Note that rearranging the optimality conditions generates (see Appendix 10) the result that zj is greater than 
a linear function of zi. 


















.   28
having to face low chances of being the elected again (i.e. facing a high probability Pi), the 
government increases its public expenditure, despite the already high debt, as a means of 










However, this has second order effects, since the higher public expenditure 
requires higher taxes, which need to be collected under the high transaction cost of the tax 








). As a result the country’s debt increases. On the other hand, 
from country j’s point of view, the high rates of the transaction cost of its tax system, 
together with the resulting inefficiency of the tax instrument, indicate that it should adopt 
policies that counteract the financing implications of the high tax rates.  
 
In other words, country j’s fiscal policy aims at public expenditure retrenchments
38, 









smoothing the progress of the contribution of its tax instrument towards decreasing the 
country’s debt level. The economic policy of this country relies on “switching strategies”
39, 
in the sense that the government of the country starts the fiscal consolidation by raising 
taxes and then moves into more politically sensitive policies, by reducing spending.  
 
With lower public spending, society’s welfare will decrease, resulting in a higher 











The reduction in country j’s debt level is enough to drive down the total MU debt, 
leaving space for the Central Banker to loosen monetary policy
40, which, again, affects the 
countries’ debt levels and, consequently, the total MU debt, which falls further, following 
the path of the economy shown in the above graph. 
 
                                                 
38 In Appendix 10 we prove that, in this case, optimality requires that zj < A+Bzi , which also indicates that it 
must be the case that gj < Γ+∆gi (For the Α, Β, Γ and ∆ calculated in the Appendix). That is, in this case, 
optimality imposes an upper bound in country j’s public spending. 
39 See, for example, OECD Economic Outlook (2007), and von Hagen et al (2002). 
40 The monetary policy rule  0 b
π
∂ < ∂
  implies that a monetary loosening is consistent with reductions in the 
slopes of the loci of the countries’ reaction functions.   29
 
 
Summing up, from the above analysis it is made clear that there exists a channel, 
via the transaction cost of the tax system, that affects the stabilisation policies of the CCB. 
In other words, the optimal solution indicates a mechanism through which the CCB 
policies, that target price stability, are related to the fiscal policy variables of each MU 
country.  
 
The transaction cost of the tax systems of the countries we introduce into our 
analysis, is an endogenous mechanism, which affects the effectiveness of the fiscal policy 
instruments. Thus, we formally show a way in which the operational cost of the tax system 
of each MU member has inflationary consequences that depend on the characteristics of 
each individual country, as a token of fiscal policy non-neutrality.     
4.5 Fiscal rules vs. transaction cost  
In this section we focus on making inferences regarding the effectiveness of the 
numerical fiscal rules we have modelled, under the constraint implied by the existence of 
the transaction cost. It is worth noting that the introduction of this cost into our analysis, 
affects the efficiency of the fiscal policy’s instrument, via an endogenous mechanism, 
which relates the efficiency of the fiscal policy (which is a quantitative result) with the 
frictions generated by the state-tax payer interaction and which are related to behavioural 
issues stipulated by the economic, sociological and psychological characteristics and tax 





































Figure 9: The path of the economy when both countries face transaction costs with 
high rates of change.   30
Keeping this in mind, we are going to use a formal analysis to investigate whether 
the numerical fiscal rule we introduce into our model (which is also examined by Uhlig and 
Beetsma (1999) and Debrun (2007)), affects the behaviour of the agents of our model. In 
terms of our analysis, we are interested in investigating whether the existence (or absence) 
of fiscal rules alters the slopes of the loci  ()
j
ji bb and  ()
i
ji bb. Since the numerical fiscal rules 
are expressed by the term  () bb δ − , where  ( ) 0,1 δ ∈ , the case of a MU without fiscal rules 
corresponds to the case where  0 δ = . In this latter case, the loci  ()
j
ji bb and  ()
i




























































for country j and country i respectively.  
 
The above loci retain the sign of their slopes, with 




i       () () <  
indicating that the existence of numerical fiscal rules does not alter the strategic behaviour 
of the countries, when the transaction cost of the tax system is explicitly modelled. A 
reasonable explanation for this is based on the micro-characteristic of the transaction cost: 
the transaction cost of the tax system relates the aspects of administration to the revenue 
losses the government incurs due to the behaviour of the tax payers, as a consequence of 
the existence of the tax system and governments’ tax policy. On the other hand, numerical 
fiscal rules (e.g. the SGP), are consistent with the government’s behaviour for deviating 
from the rules.  
 
But the transaction cost, which is the cost underlying the state–taxpayers 
interaction, is related to the behaviour of the tax payers, which are not affected by the fiscal 
rules that underlie the government’s decision. This justifies the fact that, in terms of our 
model, the numerical fiscal rules do not affect the slope of the reaction functions. 
 
This also corresponds to the way we have constructed the government’s objective 
function. Most of the theoretical work regarding economic policy issues is based on the 
assumption of the benevolent dictator government. This assumption, although consistent   31
with the needs of the models used in these theoretical works, is not consistent with our 
analysis. This is because the notion of the transaction cost (i.e. the cost that evolves from 
the state–tax payer interaction) embodies the distinction between the society (that pays the 
taxes) and the government (that imposes the taxes). This segregation makes it clear that the 
benevolent dictator assumption is not consistent with the government having identical 




We build a model in order to investigate monetary and fiscal policy interactions in 
the economic environment of a MU, with two heterogeneous countries and a common 
central banker (the CCB), who is conservative vis-à-vis inflation. In this framework, we are 
looking for economic policy implications regarding the way the efficiency of the fiscal 
policy affects the price stability pursued by the CCB.  
 
The fiscal policy non-neutrality implied above is consistent with departure from 
the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition, whose existence could be considered as a stepping 
stone toward the view that inflation is only a monetary phenomenon. The theoretical work, 
consistent with the above-mentioned “Ricardian Regime”, is based on the explicit 
assumption that the tax instrument that does not have any effect on economic activity and, 
for that reason, a lump sum or a proportional taxation scheme is introduced. 
 
Our analysis does not explicitly assume any specific type of tax instrument (e.g. 
lump sum or proportional taxation). We cope instead, with a more general consideration of 
the tax system by introducing the transaction or operation cost of the tax system. 
 
This stems from the fact, that the imposition of the taxes generates frictions which 
relate the behaviour of the tax payers, stipulated by socioeconomic and psychological 
characteristics, with tax administration aspects, like tax collection and tax compliance, 
resulting in the loss of tax revenue or deadweight loss (Feinstein 1998 JEL), with budgetary 
consequences. 
 
In this way, we have a microfountation of the macroeconomic theory regarding 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions, where, starting from the operational properties of 
the tax system, we are looking at the way the efficiency of the fiscal policy is related to the 
political cycle, the path of the debt level and the level of inflation. Assuming heterogeneous   32
countries enables us to identify possible spillovers in a monetary and fiscal policy 
interaction framework 
 
We show that when we have a considerable degree of heterogeneity, the 
transaction cost of the tax system is the factor determining the countries’ policy choices 
and hence the resulting level of debt as well as the inflation path. On the other hand, when 
we have a considerable degree of homogeneity, it is the countries’ strategic behaviour that 
determines the outcome.  
 
We formally develop a channel, through which the operation of the tax system, 
related to the fiscal policy objectives is not independent of price stability which is the 
primary objective of the CCB. Under this framework, we also show that the numerical 
fiscal rules are not efficient in altering the behavior of the agents as they do not change the 
path of the economy.   33
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APPENDIX 1: The transaction cost function 
We let Zt correspond to the real cost incurred during the tax collection process at 
time t, be a function of the total net tax take Tt and the taxable recourses Yt, i.e. Zt = F(Tt , 
Yt). 
  
Since the transaction cost of the tax system is consistent with the notion that when 
imposing taxes there exists a cost underlying the state–tax-payer interaction, it is 
reasonable to assume that this transaction cost depends positively on Tt, and negatively on 


















Assuming that the transaction cost function is homogeneous of degree one, we 
can write 






⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ == ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
So, there exists a function
41 f of the tax rate τ= 
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APPENDIX 2: The shape of the transaction cost function z 
The transaction cost is described by the function z
 = τ
 .f(τ), with a first order 
derivative given by 
() ()
z
f ff τ ττ
ττ
∂∂ ′ =⋅= +
∂∂
 
where f ΄ stands for the first order derivative of f  with respect to τ. 
 
Recall that rearranging the first order conditions of the government’s problem, 
gives 
                                                 
41 There exists a function ()
1 Y T f Y T T
Y
φφ
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1
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z
τβ ξ ′ + =− − ⋅ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦                                        (14) 
where, c = 
1/Y  - τ . 
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The above indicate that the transaction cost function, z, exhibits an inflection 
point at 
zP g c g
** * ,( ) , τβ ξ τ ch c h =⋅ − −  
of its graph and, hence, that its shape will be as shown in the following.   38
 
 
APPENDIX 3: The relationship between f and z 
As shown in Appendix 3, the transaction cost function is z
 = τ
 .f(τ), with a first 
order derivative given by 
() ()
z
f ff τ ττ
ττ
∂∂ ′ =⋅= +
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Recall that f΄ >0. Besides, looking at the second order derivative of z in another 
way, we have 
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′′ ′ ′ ′ +< ⇒< − < , indicating that, within this range, f is a 
concave function. 









′′ >− =  i.e.  f ′′ is negative (positive) for relatively low (high) 
values of the tax rate τ, indicating that, within the low τ range, f is a concave 
function, while it is convex for higher values of τ. 
 
Hence, we can draw the following diagram 
 
APPENDIX 4: The transaction cost function and the political cycle 
As shown in Appendix 1, it is zt=τf(τ) and, so, the first order derivative of the 
transaction cost function, is 
() () ()
z
zf f f τ ττ τ τ
ττ
∂∂ ′′ == ⋅ = + ⋅ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∂∂
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Hence,  
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We look for the way the political cycle is related to the shape of the transaction 
cost function (via the probability of no re-election). This will be shown by the behaviour of 
the derivative () ( )
2
zg c f f z
Pz



























These imply, given the shape of the transaction cost function and the fact that, as 
shown in Appendix 2, it is  () ()
Pz
z
Pg c g β ξ
′ ><
−−
 for  ( )0 z′′ < > , that 
 
9  when the value of the first order derivative, and hence the slope of the transaction cost 




Pg c g g c βξ β
′ >>
− −⋅ −
, which is the 
case in the “left part” of the transaction cost function graph), an increase in the 
probability of no re-election, P, is related to a lower z′′, that is, to a transaction cost 
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9  when the value of the first order derivative, and hence the slope of the transaction cost 




gc P gc g β βξ
′ <<
⋅− − −
, which is the case in the 
“middle part” of the transaction cost function graph), an increase in the probability of 
no re-election, P, is related to a lower  z′′, that is to a transaction cost line with a 
“lower” slope as τ rises. Hence, P is decreasing in this range. 
 
9  when the value of the first order derivative, and hence the slope of the transaction cost 




gc P gc g β βξ
′<<
⋅− − −
, which is the case in 
the “right part” of the transaction cost function graph), an increase in the probability of 
no re-election, P, is related to a higher z′′, that is, to a transaction cost line with a 
“higher” slope as τ rises. Hence, P is increasing in this range. 
 
APPENDIX 5: Reaction Functions 
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where, with the appropriate rearrangements and assuming 
e π π = , we get the reaction 
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Similarly, for country j, the first order conditions, require that 
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ij
G












() 11 1 111 0
je j j j j i
t t tt tt
bb
cb b bb b bb b γγ δπ δ θθ ππ
−− −
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∂∂
− − − + + − ⋅⋅ + − ⋅⋅ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠

    42
Assuming 
e π π =  and after the appropriate rearrangements, we get the reaction 






























                 (16) 
 
From the above, it can be seen that the probabilities Pi, Pj enter the constant terms 
(CTi , CTj) of the corresponding reply functions. In particular, differentiating these constant 
terms, as given by (15) and (16) gives the exact way the probabilities of no re-election for 
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APPENDIX 6: Slopes of the reaction functions 
 
As it can be seen from the analysis in Appendix 5, both reply functions are 
negative sloping. In order to plot these reply functions we need to know the relationship 
between their slopes: 
slope of 
i
jt b - slope of 
j
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This indicates that country i’s reply function is steeper than that of country j. 
 
APPENDIX 7: Equilibrium path  ( ) i bb 
  
 
The equilibrium is determined by the intersection point of the above derived reply 
functions. The locus of these points will be derived by simultaneously solving equations 
(15) and (16), which gives 
ij
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Regarding the slope of the line () i bb  , we have 
slope of  () i bb   - slope of 
j
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⇒ slope of  () i bb   > slope of 
j
jt b  (> slope of b
i
jt) 
This indicates that the locus  () i bb   is flatter than the countries’ reply functions. 
 
APPENDIX 8: The reaction function of the CCB 
 
The problem the CCB faces can be written as 
min ~
π γπ θ π Lb
ECB =+ b g di
2
2 
The first order condition for this requires that 
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APPENDIX 9: Public spending and the political cycle 
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APPENDIX 10: Limits for public expenditures 
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that is, there exists an upper limit for gj in this case. 
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